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1. Introduction
The corporate governance has been received higher and higher attention 
in the last year by academics, regulators and professional bodies. One of the key 
topics is constituted by internal control and voluntary/mandatory reporting by 
companies of internal controls information and procedures internally adopted.
The disclosure of such information with description of tools and instru-
ments used is useful for reducing information asymmetry between company 
and stakeholders. In fact, from this source of communication the market can 
appreciate and understand the effectiveness of internal control procedures.
Previous studies on governance identify board of directors, ownership 
structure and internal control as the core internal mechanism (Gillan, 2006).
The internal control has a vital function because next to the external one 
can guarantee the quality and reliability of fi nancial reporting identifying 
possible risks related to specifi c companies.
For this reason stakeholders have high interest in knowing the function-
ing and possible issues or concerns regarding internal control.
There are a lot of frameworks on Internal control system (ICS). Among 
others the general accepted framework applied worldwide is the Internal 
Control System – Integrated framework, established in 1992 by Committee 
of Sponsoring Organization and updated in the 2013.
COSO identifi es internal control as a tool can affect the effectiveness 
of operations and the quality of fi nancial reporting and, fi nally, the level 
of compliance with laws and rules. The new release of COSO framework 
presents a new vision regarding the external reporting on Internal control 
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system in order to put more attention on the signifi cance of the information 
on the adequacy and application of ICS for the stakeholders.
Control activities are put in action by management to enforce compa-
nies’ performance and to mitigate risks. At the same time the data are col-
lected and externally reported in a continuous process from inside to outside. 
Moreover, the infl uence of the information on internal control pushes 
the national standard setter to enhance the rule on the reporting of ICS.
This paper analyses the ICS disclosure in the fi nancial reporting of two 
countries: Italy and Poland. We choose these two countries in order to verify 
if the cultural, economic and social difference between them affected the 
disclosure on ICS. Moreover, the comparison of this two countries would 
like to test if the implementation of the general accepted rules on internal 
control mechanism of corporate governance that ensure the capital market 
effi ciency is the same in a relative new member (Poland) as in the founder 
(Italy) of the of the European Union.
2. Literature review 
The fi rst studies on internal control were quite descriptive aiming the 
purpose to identify effective/ineffective internal control. Some studies 
in particular analyse the relationship between ineffective internal control on 
the cost of audit (Ettredge et al., 2006; Hoitash et al., 2008).
Other studies focused on the importance of internal control in contribut-
ing to reduce information asymmetry. For instance some studies analysed 
the relationship between internal control and the quality of reporting (Doyle 
et al., 2007; Feng et al., 2009). Furthermore, internal control is seen as 
a quality factor and plays a central role in the auditors illustrated in annual 
reports (Pae, Yoo, 2001).
Internal control received also attention given that is important regarding 
the protection of fi rm’s assets. Clathworthy and Jones (2003) highlighted 
that UK companies show to favour credit for good performance and allocate 
to external factors bad performances.
Then, after the new rules provided by SOX, some studies analysed mar-
ket perception and effects in relation to company’s quality reporting after 
the new requirements of SOX (Cohen et al., 2008).
Other works in this fi eld looks for the relationship between the cred-
ibility of fi nancial reporting system and auditor characteristics and auditor 
actions (i.e. Becker et al., 1998).
While, looking at voluntary disclosure of internal control system and 
specifi c requirements, Deumes and Knechel (2008) identifi ed six disclosure 
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elements that permit to map internal control information provided by com-
panies in their annual reports.
3. Italian and Polish background
The Italian and Polish economies are very different and they are natu-
rally infl uenced by historical, cultural and social factors that characterized 
the two country.
Following the Gray’s model (1988) that developed a theoretical frame-
work of four accounting values, we focus our attention on a specifi c dimen-
sion: transparency vs. secrecy.
This dimension express the “preference for confi dentiality and the re-
striction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who 
are closely involved with its management and fi nancing as opposed to a more 
transparent, open and publicly accountable approach” (Gray, 1988, p. 8). 
The secrecy/transparency is the perfect starting point to analyse the inter-
nal control disclosure in a cross countries research: Gray argues that secrecy 
is the most relevant accounting value in infl uencing disclosure of information, 
and indicates that the Italy is less infl uenced by secrecy than Poland.
The difference between the two countries is highlighted by the diverse 
requirements present in the regulation on corporate governance and on the dif-
ferent rules regarding the disclosure on ICS of the Italian and Polish countries.
In last years the Italian corporate governance system adopted many leg-
islative reforms. Among others the Draghi Law (Consolidated Law on Fi-
nance, TUF) in 1998 that underlines the autonomy of each fi rm in choosing 
its corporate governance model. The fi nding consisted in the adoption of the 
fi rst version of the Italian Corporate Governance Code in 1999, as a set of 
self-regulatory best practices that Italian listed companies should select vol-
untarily. The Code stresses the attention on the role of the Board of Directors 
in determining and improving the strategic objectives of the company, the 
autonomy of its non-executive members and the presence of a considerable 
number of independent directors. The Code affi rms the necessity to adopt an 
internal control system and internal audit committees. The Preda Code was 
amended in 2002 and in 2006 to reinforce the international evolution in this 
matter. Among the main innovations a central role is played by the growing 
emphasis on the presence of non-executive directors who should be com-
petent and professional in order to consider various matters from different 
standpoints, and the signifi cance of the ICS and Enterprise risk management 
(Allegrini, D’Onza, 2003).
Each company needs to put in action an internal control and risk manage-
ment system composed of policies, procedures and organizational structures 
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with the purpose of identifying, measuring and monitoring the main risks. 
It is an essential part of the management of the company according with the 
objectives stated by the Board and is linked with the other control activities 
(internal auditor, risk manager, audit committee, auditor and so on).
Moreover, the ICS is signifi cant also for its role on ensuring the ad-
equacy and transparency of the corporate fi nancial reporting in order to dis-
close information concerning the company, in compliance with the rules and 
procedures governing the disclosure of price-sensitive information.
On the other hand Poland are both characterized by the continental 
model of corporate governance with a two–tier system, high concentration 
of ownership and the weak investor protections (Aluchna, Koładkiewicz, 
2010; Dobija, 2015). 
Poland is also an example of a country that is in a fast transition, where 
corporate governance standards are developing simultaneously with the de-
velopment of the capital market (Dobija, Klimczak, 2010). In such a model, 
the supervisory and management board are kept separate unlike in mature 
markets, where strong corporate governance mechanisms are considered to 
be a precondition of the effectively functioning capital market.
Poland’s fi rst corporate governance code was written and adopted by the 
public companies in 2002; however, the implementation of external moni-
toring mechanisms and transparency rules is considered to be rather low 
(Kuchenbeker, 2008). In 2005 the updated corporate governance code was 
issued and established a rule to implement an internal control system.
One of most controversial part of the new release of the Polish Code of 
Best Practice 2012 is that, despite it requires that listed companies establish 
the ICS and Audit Committee, it does not explain in details how the internal 
control system works.
4. Methodology 
The fi rst step of our analysis is to create an Internal Control Disclosure 
Score (ICDS) of the Italian and Poland companies.
The fi rst step of this disclosure index is to set up the list of optional in-
formation items carried out from an Italian format on the Corporate Govern-
ance disclosure and on the requirements of the COSO Report.
On this basis, we compiled a list of items that may give a good level of 
internal control disclosure and we use it to fi nd the information in the com-
pany annual reports of the sample Italian and Polish fi rms. 
We follow the voluntary disclosure strategies of the sample in the 2013 
in order to capture the effect of the new COSO requirements on internal 
control disclosure.
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Once we calculate the ICDS we investigate the correlation between the 
level of disclosure on internal control and the corporate governance struc-
ture of the companies.
The fi nal sample of companies disclosing information on internal con-
trol and on corporate governance variables is composed by 185 companies 
(103 Italian and 82 Polish) for year 2013.
At fi rst, the sizeable body of literature affi rms the signifi cant role of the 
corporate governance for the market transparency and for the high quality 
of the voluntary disclosure.
Moreover, a lot of researchers investigate the impact of corporate gov-
ernance on the voluntary disclosure of the various public company sectors, 
showing that the monitoring function of corporate governance signifi cantly 
infl uences the propensity toward disclosure (Lang, Lundholm, 1993; Bush-
man, Smith, 2001; Abraham, Cox, 2007; Lim et al., 2007).
On the basis of these motivations, this study investigates the impact of 
audit governance on internal control disclosure practice with the following 
model:
ICDS = β1board_ind + β2board_size + β3board_meeting + β4country + ε
The variables are:
– board_ind: number of non-executive members in the board (Patelli, 
Prencipe, 2007; Karamanou, Vafeas, 2005),
– board_size: number of the member of the board (Ajinkya et al., 2005; 
Karamanou, Vafeas, 2005),
– board_meeting: number of meeting of the board (Vafeas, 1999; Xie et 
al., 2003),
– country: dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is Polish or 0 
if Italian.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
fi rm 0
score 185 8.745946 2.597092 0 11
country 185 .5567568 .4981163 0 1
directors 185 10.06486 3.48539 2 22
independent 185 3.583784 2.229924 0 14
frequency 185 6.994595 4.415262 1 23
384   Antonella Russo, Agnieszka Herdan, Lorenzo Neri
5. Findings and conclusion 
The preliminary fi ndings of the current analysis do not show any sig-
nifi cant relationship between ICDS and the country effect but it emerges 
a relationship between ICDS and the size of board of directors (Tab. 2).
Table 2
Findings
Score Coef. RobustStd. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
country -.6412366 .4956696 -1.29 0.197 -1.619307 .3368339
directors .2427523 .0558661 4.35 0.000 .1325156 .352989
independent .0320277 .0750255 0.43 0.670 -.1160148 .1800703
frequency .0247447 .0401592 0.62 0.539 -.0544987 .1039881
_cons 6.37183 .7696404 8.28 0.000 4.853152 7.890508
This study analyses the behaviour in terms of Polish and Italian listed 
companies ICS disclosure. With a fi rst attempt on year 2013 regarding 
a sample of companies on which was possible calculating ICDS score and 
that provide information regarding some corporate governance factors we 
fi nd that the country does not infl uence statistical analysis but instead there 
is a clear effect of board of directors confi rming previous studies regarding 
fi rm performance and board of directors dimension.
The fi rst draft of this study provides so evidence of the effects of the 
regulation regarding ICS and may be helpful for Regulators and Profes-
sional Bodies.
The main limitation of the current study is linked to the consideration of 
only one year; in next draft we will fi ll this lack involving more years and, 
if possible, more companies. In the next development of the work we will 
also look for control on possible relationship between ICDS and companies’ 
characteristics.
Finally, once fi nalised the model with possible adjustments, it will be 
important to increase the sample with the inclusion of other countries.
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Abstract
The vast academic research evidenced that corporate transparency has 
favorable effects on markets and on external stakeholder judgment and deci-
sion making (e.g. Lang, Lundholm, 1993). As an important part of corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosure on internal control system has received 
a great attention after the introduction of the COSO frameworks and the 
requirements of the US Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX).
The Italian Corporate Governance Code and the Polish Code of Best 
Practice ask to increase the disclosure on internal control system in order to 
give more information on the effectiveness and effi ciency of the companies. 
Using content analysis we defi ne an Internal Control Score Disclosure 
(ICSD) of the Italian Stock Exchange companies and of Polish Stock Ex-
change companies for the year 2013 in order to investigate corporate gov-
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ernance infl uence on internal control disclosure. The ICSD will be examined 
in order to provide empirical evidence for the signifi cant increase in the dis-
closure level of internal control system and to test if, as Beeks and Brown 
(2006) stated, companies with better governance disclose more information, 
while those with a weak governance are lacking of fi nancial disclosure and 
transparency.
Preliminary fi ndings show a clear relationship between ICSD and the 
dimension of board of directors. In next stages we will involve more years 
and, if possible, more companies. In the next development of the work we 
will also look for control on possible relationship between ICDS and com-
panies’ characteristics.
Keywords: corporate governance, disclosure, fi nancial statements, internal 
control system.
Zakres ujawniania informacji w obszarze systemu 
kontroli wewnętrznej przez włoskie i polskie spółki 
giełdowe – badania empiryczne 
Streszczenie
Liczne badania naukowe dowodzą, że przejrzystość spółki ma korzystny 
wpływ na rynki, oceny dokonywane przez zewnętrznych interesariuszy 
oraz proces podejmowania decyzji (np. Lang, Lundholm, 1993). Od czasu 
wprowadzeniu ram COSO i wymagań amerykańskiego Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX) wiele uwagi poświęcono ważnemu obszarowi nadzoru korporacyj-
nego, jakim jest dobrowolne ujawnienie informacji z zakresu systemu kon-
troli wewnętrznej.
Włoski Kodeks ładu korporacyjnego i polski Kodeks dobrych praktyk 
zalecają zwiększenie zakresu ujawniania informacji w obszarze systemu 
kontroli wewnętrznej. Ma to pozwolić na zwiększenie zakresu informacji 
o skuteczności i efektywności przedsiębiorstw. Autorzy, wykorzystując me-
todę analizy treści, zdefi niowali wskaźnik ujawniania informacji o systemie 
kontroli wewnętrznej (WUISKW) spółek notowanych na włoskiej i polskiej 
giełdzie papierów wartościowych w roku 2013 r. Ma to na celu zbadanie 
wpływu ładu korporacyjnego na zakres informacji ujawnianych o systemie 
kontroli wewnętrznej spółek. Wykorzystanie WUISKW ma pokazać czy za-
kres ujawnianych informacji o systemie kontroli wewnętrznej rośnie i rów-
nocześnie zweryfi kowanie tezy Beeks i Brown (2006), że przedsiębiorstwa 
o efektywniejszym nadzorze korporacyjnym ujawniają więcej informacji, 
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podczas gdy te o mniej efektywnym nadzorze ujawniają ich znacznie mniej 
i spółki te są mniej przejrzyste. Wstępne wyniki wskazują na wyraźny zwią-
zek między WUISKW oraz składem rady dyrektorów. W następnym etapie 
czasookres badania zostanie wydłużony jak również zwiększony zostanie 
zbiór spółek objętych badaniem. Dalsze badania będą miały także na celu 
ustalenie związków pomiędzy WUISKW a cechami spółek. 
Słowa kluczowe: ład korporacyjny, zakres ujawniania informacji, sprawoz-
dania fi nansowe, system kontroli wewnętrznej.
